The bytecode verification is a key point of the security chain of the Java Platform. However, it is an optional feature in many embedded devices since the memory requirements of the verification process are too high. In this paper we propose a verification algorithm that drastically reduces the memory use by performing the verification during multiple specialized passes. The algorithm reduces the space for types encoding by operating onto different abstractions of the domain of types. Experimental results are presented showing that this bytecode verification is possible directly onto small memory systems.
Introduction
The Java programming language was born in the early 90s as a response to the need of a flexible and highly reliable way for programming smart electronic devices. It is currently being used in a growing number of areas and, in the last years, it is also advancing in the embedded system world. Among the embedded devices, Java Cards represent an interesting research challenge since they have limited resources but require high security features. Actually, a Java Card is a Smart Card running a Java Virtual Machine (VM), the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM), and it is going to be used as a secure token in fields like banking and public administration.
The JCVM is at the core of the Java Card: it is a software CPU with a stackbased architecture which creates an execution environment between the device and the programs (Java Card Applets). The JCVM guarantees hardware-independence and enforces the security constraints of the sandbox model. In particular, the Java bytecode Verifier is one of the key components of the sandbox model: the Java Card Applets are compiled in a standardized compact code, the Java Card bytecode, and the Verifier is responsible of checking the correctness of the code before the execution on the JCVM.
The Java bytecode Verifier performs a data-flow analysis on the bytecode, to ensure the type correctness of the code. For example, it ensures that the program does not forge pointers, e.g. by using integers as they were object references.
Bytecode verification enables post issuance download of Java Card Applets, even if they are taken from sources different from the card vendor. Bytecode verification can be performed off-card or on-card. However, because of the strong memory constraints of the Java Cards, the bytecode verification is unfeasible, in its standard form, directly on-card.
To perform verification on-card, many approaches have been proposed in the literature: they modify the standard verification process so that its implementation becomes suitable for memory constrained devices. We review these proposals in Section 3.1.
In this paper, we propose and evaluate an alternative approach. It is based on the idea of checking the bytecode correctness with a progressive analysis which requires much less memory than the standard one.
Standard bytecode verification
The result of the compilation of a Java program is a set of class files: a class file is generated by the Java Compiler for each class definition of the program. A Java Card applet is obtained by transforming the class files into cap files in order to perform name resolution and initial address linking [3] . In the following, we will refer to the class files only, since cap files and class files contain conceptually the same information.
A class file is composed of the declaration of the class and of a JVM Language (JVML) bytecode for each method of the class. The JVML instructions are typed: for example, iload loads an integer onto the stack, while aload loads a reference.
The Verifier performs a data-flow analysis of the code by abstractly executing the instructions over types instead of actual values. A Java bytecode verification algorithm is presented in [8] : almost all existing bytecode Verifiers implement that algorithm. The verification process is performed method per method: when verifying a method, the other methods are assumed to be correct. Figure 1 shows the JVML instructions. For simplicity, we assume subroutines have a unique return address. We use the following notation for the types: BasicType = {int, float , . . .}; ReferenceType = ReferenceObject | ReferenceArray; AddressType = ReferenceType | ReturnAddress; β ∈ BasicType; τ ∈ {AddressType ∪ BasicType}; τ ∈ {ReferenceType ∪ BasicType}; [τ ∈ ReferenceArray; C ∈ ClassType.
The types form a domain, where ⊤ is the top element and ⊥ is the bottom element. In this domain ⊤ represents either the undefined type or an incorrect type.
The class types C are related as specified by the class hierarchy. Figure 2 shows an example of class hierarchy: E, F and G are user defined classes, with F and G extending E. Not all types are shown.
Each method is denoted by an expression of the form C.m(τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) : τ r , where C is the class which method m belongs to, τ 1 , . . . , τ n are the argument types and τ r is the type of the return value. Each method is compiled into a (finite) sequence of βop : β ′ Takes two operands of type β from the stack, and pushes the result of op ∈ { add, mul, cmpg... } (of type β ′ ) onto the stack βconst d
Loads a constant d of type β onto the stack τ load x Loads the value of type τ contained in register x onto the stack τ store x Takes a value of typeτ from the stack and stores it into register x ifcond L Takes a value of type int from the stack, and jumps to L if the value satisfies cond ∈ { eq, ge, .
Creates an instance of class C and puts a reference to the created instance on top of the stack newarray τ
Creates an instance of an array of class τ and puts a reference to the instance on top of the stack βaload Takes an array reference and an integer index from the stack. The array reference is of type [β. Loads on the stack the reference of type β saved at the index position in the referenced array. βastore Takes an array reference, an integer index and a reference from the stack. The array reference is of type [β, the reference of type β.
The reference is saved into the referenced array at the index position. aaload Takes an array reference and an integer index from the stack. The array reference is of type [C. Loads on the stack the reference of type C saved at the index position in the referenced array. aastore Takes an array reference, an integer index and a reference from the stack. The array reference is of type [C, the reference of type C. The reference is saved into the referenced array at the index position. getfield C.f : τ
Takes an object reference of class C from the stack; fetches field f (of type τ ) of the object and loads the field on top of the stack putfield C.f : τ Takes a value of type τ and an object reference of class C from the stack; saves the value in the field f of the object invoke C.m(τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) : τ r
Takes the values v 1 , . . . , v n (of types τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) and an object reference of class C from the stack. Invokes method C.m of the referenced object with actual parameters v 1 , · · · , v n ; places the method return value (of type τ r ) on top of the stack τ return Takes the value of type τ from the stack and terminates the method. jsr L Places on the stack the address of the successor and jumps to L ret x Jumps to the address specified in register x Figure 3 shows the rules of the standard verification algorithm. Each rule has a precondition, containing a set of constraints, and a postcondition, containing the transition from the before to the after state of an instruction. For example, an iload x instruction requires a non-full stack and the int type associated to register x, and its effect is to push int onto the stack. We have used λ to denote the empty stack and, for simplicity, the rules show only the constraints on types.
The goal of the verification is to assign to each instruction i a mapping M i from the registers to the types, and a mapping s i from the elements in the stack to the types. These mappings represent the state St i = (M i , s i ) in which the instruction i is executed. A state St i is computed as the least upper bound of all the interpreter states Q i = i, M, s obtained while applying the rules. The rules are applied within a standard fixpoint iteration which uses a worklist algorithm. Until the worklist is not empty, an instruction B[i] is taken from the worklist and the states at the successor program points are computed. If the computed state for a successor program point j changes (either the state at j has been not yet computed or the already computed state differs), B[j] is added to the worklist. The fixpoint is reached when the worklist becomes empty. Initially, the worklist contains only the first instruction of the bytecode. The initial types of stack and registers represent the state on method entrance: the stack is empty and the type of the registers are set as specified by the method signature (the registers not associated with the method's arguments hold the undefined type ⊤).
As a consequence of the algorithm, the state at a program point of the instructions representing a merge point between control paths (i.e. having more than one predecessor in the control flow graph) is the least upper bound of the after state of all the predecessors. If, for example, register x has type int on a path and type ⊤ on another 
On-card bytecode verification
The verification algorithm is expensive both in computation time and memory space since a data-flow analysis of the code is performed. The before state of each instruction must be recorded during the analysis. As an optimization, Sun's bytecode Verifier maintains the state of each program point that is either the target of a branch or the entry point of an exception handler [7] . The set of states saved during the data-flow analysis is called dictionary. The on-card bytecode verification is formally identical to a standard verification. However, special optimizations must be used since cards have limited resources. Commercial 2004 Java Cards typically provide 1-4KB of RAM, 32-64KB of persistent writable memory and 128-256KB of ROM. Only the RAM should be used to store temporary data structures since persistent memory is too slow and allows a limited number of writing cycles.
Related work
Many approaches have been presented to develop an on-card Verifier.
Rose and Rose [11] propose a solution based on a certification system (inspired by the PCC, 'Proof Carrying Code' work by Necula [10] ). The verification process is split in two phases: lightweight bytecode certification (LBC) and lightweight bytecode verification (LBV). The LBC is performed off-card and produces a certificate that must be distributed with the bytecode. The LBV is performed on-card, and it is a linear verification process that uses the certificate to assure that the bytecode is safe. The LBV is currently used in the KVM of Sun's Java 2 Micro Edition.
Leroy, in [6] , proposes to reduce memory requirements with an off-card transformation of the code, also known as 'code normalization'. The transformed code complies with the following constraints: every register contains the same type for all method instructions and the stack is empty at the merge points. The verification of a 'normalized' code is not expensive: only one global state is required since the type of the registers do never change.
Deville and Grimaud [4] propose to use the persistent memory for storing the data structures needed for the verification process. Their strategy holds as long as possible all data structures in RAM, and swaps them in persistent memory when RAM space is missing. A particular type of encoding is proposed since persistent memory cells have a limited numbers of writing cycles.
In [2] , a verification algorithm which reduces the dictionary size by dynamically allocating its entries has been presented. The algorithm assigns a life-time to the dictionary entries, splits the methods code into control regions [5] and analyzes the regions one-by-one. Each region is analyzed by applying the standard verification algorithm: the dictionary size is reduced since unnecessary entries are never held in memory. 
Figure 4: An example of standard data-flow and multipass data-flow.
Our approach
In this paper we present a space-aware bytecode verification algorithm which reduces the size of the dictionary by performing a progressive analysis on different abstractions of the domain of types.
The multipass concept
The multipass verification algorithm is the standard algorithm performed in many specialized passes. Each pass is dedicated to a type. The dictionary size is reduced since, during each pass, the abstract interpreter needs to know only if the type (saved in a register or in a stack location) is compatible with the pass or not. The type compatibility is given by the types hierarchy. Actually, only one bit is needed to specify the type of the data saved in registers and stack locations. The analysis is performed on the whole bytecode for every pass. The number of passes depends on the instructions contained in the method: one pass is needed for each type used by the instructions. Additional passes are also needed to check the initialization of objects (this concept will be expounded upon later in Section 4.4).
The multipass verification is possible since the bytecode instructions are typed and the number of types is limited: basic types (int, byte, ...), reference types (the ones listed in the constant pool) and return address type.
An example of data-flow analysis (dfa) performed with the standard approach and with the multipass approach is proposed in Figure 4 . We can notice the different encoding strategies for the two approaches: during the standard dfa the types are fully specified. On the other hand, during each pass of the multipass dfa, a one bit encoding of the types is used.
The rules
We first formalize the operations performed by the standard Verifier.
Definition 1 (transition system)
, where Q is a set of states, Q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and −→⊆ Q × Q is the transition relation.
We say that there is a transition from Q to Q ′ if (Q, Q ′ ) ∈−→, and we write Q −→ Q ′ . We denote with * −→ the reflexive and transitive closure of −→. We say that a state Q ∈ Q is a final state of the transition system if and only if no Q ′ exists such that Q −→ Q ′ (we write Q −→). Let D be the set of types, V the set of registers, A the set of bytecode addresses, I the set of bytecode instructions, M : V → D the set of memories (M associates a type to every register) and S the set of finite sequences of elements of D (S associates a type to every element in the stack locations). An interpreter state is defined as a triple i, M, s , where i ∈ A, M ∈ M and s ∈ S. Given a method m, we define B m : A → I as the instruction sequence of the method. We assume that a lattice L = (D, ⊑) of types is defined (it is shown in Figure 2 ). The ⊑ relation is extended pointwise to the sets M, S. The rules shown in Figure 3 define a relation −→⊆ Q×Q.
Given a method C.m(τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) : τ r , which contains a bytecode sequence B, we define the initial memory
0 (i) = ⊤ otherwise (M 0 assigns types to the registers according to the method parameters). We define by (Q, −→, 0, M 0 , λ ) the transition system defined by the rules in Figure 3 , starting from the initial state 0, M 0 , λ . This transition system is an abstract interpretation of the execution of the bytecode. The Verifier implicitly uses this abstract interpretation to associate a state with each instruction of the bytecode. During the data-flow analysis, the state associated to instruction at offset i is
is the least upper bounds of memories and stacks of all the interpreter states i, M, s that appear in the transition system.
The standard Verifier gives an error if, starting from state 0, M 0 , λ , produces a state i, M, s where it can make no further transition, and i = −1. Formally, we write: 0, M 0 , λ * −→ We are now going to give a formal description of the multipass algorithm. For each pass type p ∈ D, we define a lattice
We define also the function α p : D → D p as:
which means that the abstraction of a type t is ⊥ p if and only if t is assignment compatible with the type p of the pass. For example, if t ∈ C, the abstraction function for class type E (refer to the lattice in Figure 2 ) is the following:
The function α p is extended pointwise to the sets M and S. For each type p ∈ D, we define a transition system (
Each transition relation −→ p of the multipass is obtained by the corresponding standard transition relation (defined in Figure 3) by simply applying the α p function to the types and by changing each ⊑ with ⊑ p . The multipass rules are shown in Figure 5 . In the following we are going to explain some of the rules.
Let us consider a βop : β ′ instruction: iadd. In this case β = int and β ′ = int. The constraints to be checked are v 1 ⊑ p α p (int ) and v 2 ⊑ p α p (int ). Notice that the constraints may fail only during the int pass, since α p (int ) = ⊥ int if and only if p = int . If the top and next-to-top positions of the stack contain valid types (i.e. ⊥ int ) then the rule is successfully applied and the transition is performed:
For the iadd instruction, if the pass is different from int, the α p function returns ⊤ int , thus the constraints are always satisfied and the transition is performed consequently. Notice also that, when the pass p is different from int, the iadd instruction always places ⊤ p on the stack, since Let us consider a τ load x instruction: aload. In this case τ = ReferenceType. As a consequence, the constraint in the rule is M (x) ⊑ p α p (ReferenceType). The constraint may fail only during the ReferenceType pass, since α p (ReferenceType) = ⊥ p if and only if ReferenceType ⊑ p. If the constraint fails then the abstraction of the type found in register x was not compatible with a reference type.
Notice that the aload and the astore instructions have asymmetric behaviors since the aload does not work on the ReturnAddress type (different prefixes have been used in the rules for this two instructions). The βop, τ const, ifcond, newarray, τ load andτ store instructions are always checked during one pass. The other instructions may require operands of different types, thus their constraints are possibly checked in more that one pass.
The aaload instruction
The aaload instruction needs some additional explanations. The instruction loads onto the stack the elements contained in array of references: it takes from the stack an index and an array reference, and pushes a reference to the array element on the stack. For instance if, during the verification process, the type of the array reference is [A, then the type placed on the stack by the aaload is A.
During the standard verification, the return type is inferred by examining the type of the array reference on the stack; during the multipass verification, on the other hand, the type is inferred by the pass type. Since the type returned by the aaload is different from the one of the operands, the multipass Verifier checks the returned type in a different pass. In particular, the returned type of the aaload can be checked only during the ReferenceType pass since the type is computed by inspecting the instruction The rules of the multipass interpreter prefix only: the aaload instruction embeds no detailed information about the class of the array of references it is going to work with. The rule of the standard Verifier places a value of type C on the stack, the multipass interpreter places α p (ReferenceType). The standard interpreter can compute the class C since the array reference on the stack is of type [C. The correct type in the multipass should have been α p (C), but it cannot be computed with the types stored in the stack of the multipass.
This loss of precision possibly causes the refuse of type-correct bytecodes. Nevertheless, we can notice that arrays of references are actually never used in Java Card applets. Anyway, the loss of precision can be solved, for example, by specializing the analysis for each array of reference type, and by using a two-bits type encoding in order to analyze the array references and the array elements in the same pass.
The correctness
We now prove that bytecodes rejected by the standard Verifier are also rejected by the multipass Verifier. We use the following definitions and lemmas. Given p ∈ D, we define a binary relation safe p ∈ Q × Q p as:
We naturally extend the safe p relation to transition systems.
The following Lemma states that ∀p, α p is an homomorphism:
Proof sketch. By cases on the rules of Figure 3 Notice that when α p (Q ′ ) < p Q ′ p the abstraction loses precision [12] .
Lemma 2 (monotonicity) Given p ∈ D and two states
Proof sketch. By cases on the rules of Figure 5 The homomorphism and the monotonicity properties guarantee that the standard transition system is safely approximated by the multipass transition system obtained with the α p function [12] .
Proof sketch. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
The following Lemma defines a property of the α p function.
The following theorem states that if the standard Verifier gives an error, then ∃p such that −→ p gets stuck.
Proof sketch. Given that 0, M 0 , λ * →, there exists a final state Q = i, M, s , with i = −1; from Lemma 3, we know that, for each p, there exists Q p = i, M p , s p such that Q safe p Q p . Then, for each possible final state Q, we have to show that there exists p such that Q p is also final. The proof proceeds by cases: B[i] must be one of the instructions enumerated in the rules of Figure 3 . Only one rule (two if the instruction is an if) could be applied to make a transition from Q. Since Q is final, the corresponding rule cannot be applied : this means that either the preconditions are not met, or the form of the before state in the transition does not match Q. The following reasoning must be repeated for each rule. It is easy to show that, if Q does not match the before state of the transition, the form of Q p does not match in the corresponding multipass rule, so Q p is final (for every p). If a precondition is not met, we note that all the preconditions, in Figure 3 , are of the form v ⊑ v ′ , with v taken from the before state (in a register or on the stack) and v ′ fixed by the instruction. The corresponding constraint in Figure 5 becomesv ⊑ p α p (v ′ ), wherev is taken from the corresponding position in the (abstract) before state. From the definition of the safe p relation, we know that, for each p, α p (v) ⊑ pv and, by Lemma 4, we know that ∃p such that
. Thus, we must havev ⊑p αp(v ′ ). This implies that state Qp does not meet a precondition in the (only) rule that could be used to make a transition, so it is a final state.
Checking objects initialization
The creation of a new object is a single statement in the Java programming language: the statement provides object allocation and initialization. In the bytecode, otherwise, the object initialization must be checked since the objects are created during two distinct phases. The first phase is the allocation of the space in the heap, the second is the object initialization. In particular, the new instruction allocates the space, and the call to the appropriate constructor <init> performs the object initialization. The Verifier checks that the objects are not initialized twice and that they are not used before they have been initialized [9] .
Notice that references to multiple not-yet-initialized objects may be present in stack locations and in registers: the constructor must know, when it is called during the verification process, which references point to which object in order to initialize them correctly. The standard verification algorithm uses a special type to keep trace of the uninitialized objects [9] . The special type contains the bytecode position of the new instruction that creates the object instance.
The multipass analysis requires an additional pass for each class type: uninitialized objects of a given class are traced within a pass. A data structure that holds information about the instance of uninitialized objects is also needed. It should be noted that uninitialized objects must not be present in stack locations and in registers when a backwards branch is taken [9] . This last constraint simplifies the data structure needed during the multipass: its size is constant and the object initialization can be resolved with a FIFO strategy.
Experimental Results
A prototype tools has been developed by using the open-source BCEL/JustIce package [1] . BCEL (ByteCode Engineering Library) is a set of APIs that provides an objectoriented view of binary class files. JustIce is a bytecode Verifier. The prototype is a modified version of JustIce: the main modifications have been made to specialize the data-flow engine for the multipass process. It is available at http://www.ing.unipi.it/ o1833499.
The prototype has been tested with a large number of methods. In the following we are presenting the statistics for five applications: 1) Azureus, an open-source peerto-peer application: it contains a large number of network and identification methods; 2) JGraphT, an open-source mathematical library; 3) Jasper, a class file disassembler; 4) the Java Card Runtime Environment; 5) the Pacap prototype, an Electronic Purse application.
The statistics include the number of targets and the dictionary size for the standard and for the multipass verification. As expected, the dictionary size of the multipass verification is over than ten times smaller with respect to the dictionary size of the standard verification. All the space gained is due to the encoding of the types: 1 bit for the multipass, 3 bytes for the standard. Figure 6 reports the dictionary size during the verification process of methods belonging to the examined packages (the space overhead for the dictionary indexing is not taken into account). The dictionary size is computed as T × (H + N ) × E, where T is the number of targets, H and N are the maximum stack height and maximum register number, E is the number of bytes needed to encode the types. As we can see, the standard verification of some methods requires more than 2KB of RAM and, for complex methods, 4KB of RAM is not even enough. The multipass verification, on the other hand, comfortably fits in 1KB of RAM for all the examined methods. Moreover, it should be noted that the dictionary usually contains many duplicated states when the number of targets is very large: the one bit encoding of the types reduces the number of possible states thus, in some cases, the dictionary size can be optimized further by avoiding states duplication [2] .
Some considerations on the time needed to perform a complete multipass verification can be made. We have analyzed the number of passes, needed for each method, to perform a complete multipass verification: it depends on the instructions contained in Figure 6 : Dictionary size of some methods.
the method and, in many cases, it is much smaller than what we could have expected by simply analyzing the constant pool. For the methods we have tested, the total number of types (types in the constant pool and basic types) was 26.7 in average, while the number of types actually used in the methods was only 5.8 (22%), in average. We should also consider that each pass of the multipass Verifier is much simpler than the standard one: in particular, the multipass verification always compares bits, while the standard one usually needs to traverse the class hierarchy for computing results.
Further work and conclusions
In this paper we have presented an approach for bytecode verification that optimizes the use of system memory and we have proved it correct with respect to the standard dataflow analysis. The approach reduces the space for the encoding of types by executing multiple passes and by verifying a single type at every pass. It should be noted that, by increasing the number of bits used to encode the types, the multipass analysis can be performed on more than one type during each step. In particular, the multipass analysis can be fine-tuned on the card characteristics. The multipass approach is general and potentially applicable to different optimizations and application areas. For example it can be used to improve the time performances of data-flow analysis on multi-processor systems. Within a multipass strategy, each processor could analyze the whole code for a different abstraction, and the analysis could be fully parallelized.
